My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack

The article documents a real-time investigation and response to the LiteLLM 1.82.8 PyPI supply chain attack, from a frozen laptop to public disclosure in 72 minutes using Claude Code.

• •litellm v1.82.8 was uploaded to PyPI with malware embedded in litellm_init.pth (34 KB), designed for credential theft, Kubernetes lateral movement, and data exfiltration
• •The compromised package reached the system via futuresearch-mcp-legacy, a Cursor MCP server dependency that pulled the poisoned litellm version
• •Malware attempted persistence by writing to ~/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py, but a force reboot triggered by an 11k-process fork bomb partially neutralized it
• •Claude Code drove the entire investigation: parsing journalctl logs, decoding base64 payloads, confirming live infection via isolated Docker download, and contacting PyPI security